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the ENP as a key step towards a long-term sustainable 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As 
European norms receive a deeper and broader 
recognition, so do new alternatives to the classical 
power-based conflict resolution approaches.
 
This report reviews the background to the ENP 
implementation in Armenia and explores the 
linkages between the ENP Action Plan and the 
Nagorno Karabakh issue. The report also describes 
the mechanisms used by the international actors in 
the processes of conflict resolution. Special attention 
is paid to the role of the EU and to recommendations 
for future action of the EU in the region.
Tevan J. POGHOSYAN
Executive Director
International Center for Human Development 
(ICHD)
Yerevan, Armenia
FOREWORD
The end of the Cold War and the eventual collapse of 
the Soviet Union uncovered a number of inter-ethnic 
problems and latent conflicts. The violent response 
of the governments to regional conflicts lent some 
legitimacy to secessionist states claiming sovereignty. 
As a result, the international community was also 
unable to prioritise between two major international 
legal principles at the core of most conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space; the right to self-determination and 
the principle of territorial integrity.
The Nagorno Karabakh issue, one of the unresolved 
post-Soviet conflicts, is critical not only to the 
vital interests of Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan, but also to regional stability and both 
the political and security concerns of the Russian 
Federation, Turkey, Iran, the EU and the USA. The 
current map of interests in the Caucasus includes 
three de jure recognised Caucasus countries: Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also their neighbours: 
Russia, Turkey and Iran. The global centres of power 
also have interests in this region and the activities 
of the US, the EU and China significantly affect the 
balance of power in the Caucasus.
Armenia and its neighbours in the Caucasus live 
with unresolved conflicts. Nevertheless, Armenia 
believes and participates in regional cooperation and 
confidence building initiatives to pave a way towards 
a European future for the region.  Many Armenians 
believe in a resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict that will lead to peaceful coexistence between 
the nations of the Caucasus.
The EU has had little involvement in the resolution of 
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  This was in spite of its 
focus on the ENP Action Plan, which it envisaged as a 
key instrument for solving the conflict. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2006, 
raised general expectations that the process of conflict 
resolution would get a new impetus. Civil society 
and, to a lesser extent, the national governments, 
increasingly regard a successful implementation of 
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The Armenian Enp and Conflict Resolution in Nagorno Karabakh 6
2  THE EUROPEAN     
NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY  
IN ARMENIA
2.1  ENP Implementation in Armenia 
The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan 
for Armenia focuses on support for democratic 
structures and good governance, support for 
regulatory reform and capacity building, and support 
for poverty reduction efforts.2 Armenia generally 
considers the ENP Action Plan to be an important 
tool for economic development and, therefore, it 
implements the Action Plan upon a selective basis, 
with only limited legislative steps taken with respect 
to the political agenda of the Action Plan.  The specific 
interests of Armenia as related to the Action Plan are 
free trade and visa facilitation, as well as conflict 
resolution and regional co-operation. Armenia’s 
priorities on the ENP AP implementation for 2008 
are the improvement of the business climate, customs 
reform and strengthening of export sectors.3
 
Armenia has developed the institutional framework 
and the tools for the implementation of the Action 
Plan and in 2006 it elaborated a National Programme 
for the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA) implementation for the period 2006-2009 
which includes legislative, policy and institutional 
approximation measures..4 Each year, the government 
approves an action plan for ENP implementation, with 
some involvement of civil society in the discussions 
regarding the annual implementation tools.  With 
regard to the administrative capacity, however, 
problems with inter-agency coordination remain 
and the various proposals for creating a coordinating 
body (Ministry for European Integration and an EU 
Integration Department under the Office of the Prime 
Minister) have hitherto not been put into practice. 
Civil society is involved in monitoring the ENP 
Action Plan and in providing legal and policy advice 
for the implementation of the ENP.  The Armenian 
1  INTRODUCTION
The aims of this report are to critically assess how 
the European Union has employed the instruments 
at its disposal to contribute to the resolution of the 
conflict in Nagorno Karabakh and how it can better 
use the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a 
means of advancing the resolution of the protracted 
differences between Armenia,  Azerbaijan, and the 
people of Nagorno Karabakh.  Specifically, this report 
will seek to:
 
▪ offer a comprehensive assessment of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict in order to contribute 
to strategic planning thereto at the EU level 
(European Commission/European Council/EU 
Member States) as concerns the resolution of the 
conflict.  
▪  provide an overview of the existing international 
responses and identify the EU’s position in regard 
to other actors involved. 
▪  critically assess how the EU used the policy 
instruments at its disposal within the framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 
how their implementation could have contributed 
to the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict.
▪  identify challenges, needs and options for future 
EU involvement in conflict resolution.
This report reflects the work of the Council of Experts 
on the ENP and Conflict Resolution in Armenia. This 
council was established in 2006 by the ICHD as part 
of a regional effort to create closer linkages between 
civil society and governments in the Black Sea 
Region. Since then, there have been regular meetings 
with governmental officials and independent experts 
as regards various issues related to the ENP and the 
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict1. 
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social protection. The Government of Armenia has 
elaborated a revised poverty reduction strategy paper 
for the period 2008-2021. 
There has been further improvement of the business 
climate, although international surveys indicate that 
these improvements are coming at a much slower 
pace as compared to previous years.
Other evaluations - International organisations, 
local non-governmental organisations and 
institutions have pointed out the weaknesses of 
Armenia’s political system:
 
▪ Armen Harutunyan, the Armenian Ombudsman, 
declared in a March 2008 report:  “We think 
that the present situation is conditioned by [a] 
rough governing system, over-centralisation 
of power, [an] artificial … system of checks and 
balances, social and economic polarisation, a 
combination of business and authorities, absence 
of public control over authorities, deficiency 
of civil liberties….  All of these result in the fact 
that one big part of our society feels apart from 
the administration, has a total distrust towards 
public institutes, electoral mechanisms, justice 
and mass media.”7
 
▪ The OSCE final report on the 2008 presidential 
elections says that:  “Whilst the 2008 presidential 
election mostly met OSCE commitments and 
international standards in the pre-election period 
and during voting hours, serious challenges to 
some commitments did emerge, especially after 
election day.  This displayed an insufficient regard 
for standards essential to democratic elections 
and devalued the overall election process. 
In particular, the vote count demonstrated 
deficiencies of accountability and transparency 
and complaints and appeals procedures were not 
fully effective.”8
▪ The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (PACE) had asked for a number of 
measures to be taken to end the political deadlock 
in the country and threatened to suspend the 
voting rights of the Armenian PACE delegation. 
During the PACE session in June 2008, however, 
the Assembly considered that the initial term 
given to the Armenian authorities was too short. 
It therefore set a new deadline of January 2009, in 
order to ensure full compliance with its demands, 
especially the question of the investigations into 
the March events and the release of detainees. 
The new PACE resolution (1620, 25 June) was 
European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC) 
is conducting a structured assessment of the gap 
between Armenian and European legislation and is 
providing advice on the requirements for increasing 
the administrative capacity.  At the civil society level, 
there is however no overarching initiative for the 
independent monitoring of the Action Plan. AEPLAC 
released a report in August 2007, showing that the 
government considers the EU integration process to 
be a long-term priority for Armenia’s overall economic 
development and that several state bodies (Ministries 
of Agriculture, Trade and Economic Development, 
Labour and Social Affairs, Finance and Economy, 
etc.) have included in their work plans a number of 
measures set forth in the draft National Programme. 
Furthermore, the report emphasised that a 
considerable number of legal, policy and institutional 
approximation measures have been implemented 
so far. The analysis pointed out, however, that legal 
approximation needs to be accompanied by extensive 
legislative, policy and administrative reforms.5
The European Commission’s report on ENP AP 
implementation represents the main document which 
measures the progress of the activities, especially 
concerning political areas.  Overall, the 2007 report is 
quite positive. The European Commission has noted 
progress within the following sectors:6
Good progress was achieved in particular in the areas 
of judiciary reform, the administration of elections 
and the institute of the Ombudsman, although a 
proper implementation of the legislative framework 
is needed.  Additionally, a package of legislative 
reforms related to the 2005 Armenian constitutional 
reform was implemented in 2007, increasing powers 
for the National Assembly and improving local self-
government.
Progress was achieved in general as regards human 
rights although room for further improvement 
remains. 
The issue of corruption still needs to be addressed.
Armenia registered good macro-economic 
performance and double digit growth for the sixth 
consecutive year.
There has been progress in reducing poverty (29 
percent in 2007, and a reduction of extreme poverty 
to 6.5 percent) and, for the first time, a noted decrease 
in the poverty of rural areas. However, additional 
efforts are still needed, especially in the area of 
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received with criticism from the opposition and 
independent experts, especially as concerned the 
situation of detainees.9 
2.2  The ENP Action Plan and the  
 Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Conflict resolution is a priority area in the Armenian 
ENP Action Plan. In fact, the European Union calls for 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan to increase diplomatic 
efforts and political dialogue (through the European 
Union Special Representative, support for the OSCE 
Minsk Group and dialogue with the states and parties 
involved), to encourage people-to-people contacts, to 
support humanitarian and de-mining initiatives, to 
provide assistance to Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and refugees and to promote an active 
involvement of civil society.  
Armenia Azerbaijan
Priority Area 7: Contribute to a peaceful 
solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
Priority Area 1: Contribute to a peaceful solution of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
Increase diplomatic efforts, including through 
the EUSR, and continue to support a peaceful 
solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
Increase diplomatic efforts, including through the EUSR, 
and continue to support a peaceful solution of the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict.
Increase political support to the OSCE Minsk 
Group conflict settlement efforts on the basis of 
international norms and principles, including the 
principle of self determination of peoples.
Increase political support to OSCE Minsk Group conflict 
settlement efforts on the basis of the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions and OSCE documents and decisions.
Encourage people-to-people contacts. Encourage people-to-people contacts.
Intensify the EU dialogue with the parties 
concerned with a view to the acceleration of the 
negotiations towards a political settlement.
Intensify the EU dialogue with the states concerned with 
a view to the acceleration of the negotiations towards a 
political settlement.
Explore possibilities to provide EU support for 
humanitarian and de-mining initiatives.
Implement de-mining initiatives.
Promote measures to assist refugees and IDPs. Promote measures to assist IDPs and refugees.
Promote the active involvement of civil society. Promote the active involvement of civil society.
Reinforce the cooperation on these and other 
matters in support of conflict resolution with 
the EU Special Representative for the Southern 
Caucasus.
Reinforce the cooperation on these and other matters 
in support of conflict resolution with the EU Special 
Representative for the Southern Caucasus.
Table 1: Conflict resolution as priority area within the 
ENP AP
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▪ People-to-people talks: Very limited steps 
have been taken for the promotion of people-to-
people contacts and the further involvement of 
civil society.  The July 2007 visit of Armenian 
and Azerbaijani intellectuals to Baku, Yerevan 
and Stepanakert – marking an important and 
positive turn in Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, 
given that it was initiated by official authorities 
and not civil society activists, as had been the 
case in the past – was not followed up. No visible 
change of approach was noticeable from the side 
of the governments, which still declare having the 
exclusive monopoly on conflict resolution.  
▪ Neglected facts: One should not forget that 
some parts of Karabakh proper are also still 
under Azerbaijani occupation: namely, parts of 
the Martakert and Martouni regions, as well as 
the whole Shahoumyan region.  
▪ ENPI: The utilisation of European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) funds for 
cross-border cooperation (Armenia-Azerbaijan) 
was allegedly postponed by Azerbaijan as its 
position remains that no cooperation can take 
place until Armenian local forces withdraw from 
the occupied territories.
It should be noted that the only differences between 
the two ENP Action Plans in reference to conflict 
resolution are the mentioning of the UN Security 
Council resolutions and the OSCE documents as 
a basis for negotiations under the Minsk Group in 
the ENP AP for Azerbaijan and of the international 
norms and principles, including the principle of 
self-determination, for Armenia.  Moreover, the 
Action Plan also reflects the different views of 
both countries with regard to the conflict and the 
participation of Nagorno Karabakh. The Azerbaijani 
ENP AP mentions political dialogue with “the states 
concerned” whilst the Armenian ENP AP mentions 
political dialogue with “the parties concerned.”  This 
indicates the lack of a principled, ideological value-
based approach from the EU regarding the resolution 
of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict10. 
The most important aspect of the Armenian ENP 
Action Plan is the fact that it commits the state to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. So far, however, 
the EU has failed to define for all parties involved a 
clear and common line of engagement with regard 
to the stimulation of  people-to people contacts and 
the involvement of civil society. There has been very 
limited pressure from the EU upon the Armenian 
Government in forging people-to-people contacts 
and engaging civil society.
 
The following progress was noted in 2007:
▪ EUSR: The EUSR became more active with 
regards to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and 
presented some proposals for Confidence-building 
measures (CBM), having regular meetings in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan with governmental and 
non-governmental representatives. However, 
the EUSR has not been able to visit Nagorno 
Karabakh due to Azerbaijan’s opposition.  
 
▪ France: France continues to inform EU Member 
States about the progress and development of the 
negotiation process in the framework of the Minsk 
Group process, as the EU has delegated its role in 
the negotiations primarily to France.11 However, 
some issues related to communication and 
coordination with EU institutions and Member 
States (the UN General Assembly resolution, for 
example, which was voted against by France, 
while  all other Member States abstained) remain 
unresolved. 
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3  THE NAGORNO
  KARABAKH 
  CONFLICT – 
  ANASSESSMENT 
This section aims to, from an Armenian perspective, 
identify the main factors that keep the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict alive.  It will address both the issues 
and the factors involved by building a systematic 
perspective on the conflict. Further, the international 
(and EU) engagement in conflict resolution in terms 
of type of responses, their implementation and 
effectiveness, will be discussed.  
3.1  The Nagorno Karabakh
 Conflict – Issues and Factors 
Identity/
Ethnicity Political
Geopolitical 
level
Capacities 
for positive 
transformation 
(peace)
Is
su
es
Nationalism
Society (pseudo-
patriotism)
Dealing with the past
Media
Soviet legacy
War party
Militarisation
Coercive approach
Economic costs and 
benefits
Legitimacy issues
Russia
Turkey
Iran
US
EU
Democratic development
Economic incentives
Military balance
International mediation
Civil society 
Media
Table 2: Critical factors and issues regarding the 
Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
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The low level of development and professionalism 
of the media had an important role in starting the 
conflict. At present, the media still propagates 
stereotypical “enemy”-images and continues to make 
accusations of defeatism or of “pacifist” leanings at 
a time when any restarting of the war is mentioned 
by the elites on both sides; more in Azerbaijan, but 
increasingly so in Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.16 
Monitoring of the Azerbaijani and Armenian press 
for the period January-September 2005 done by 
press clubs from Yerevan and Baku, for example, 
showed that the distrust towards each other prevails 
and that mutual fears are strong in both countries. 
The findings of the study indicate that the share of 
news items on each other with negative connotations 
is significant in both the Armenian and the 
Azerbaijani press.  The difference, however, is that 
the negative pieces on Armenians in the Azerbaijani 
press are several times more numerous than those 
on Azerbaijanis in the Armenian press, although the 
situation is improving with the establishment of more 
journalism schools.17 Further, press monitoring from 
2004 showed that Azerbaijanis link the image of the 
enemy to Armenians, even when they are told about 
issues unrelated to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. 
Armenian press, on the other hand, represents the 
image of the enemy through the negative image of 
either a Turk or an Azerbaijani.18 In fact, thousands 
of Armenians freely travel to Turkey, and thousands 
of Turks and Azerbaijanis visit Armenia without any 
obstacles. The situation is totally different in the case of 
Azerbaijan, where even citizens of Armenian descent 
from other states are not able to travel to the country 
easily.  This is due to the strong dependence of both 
Armenian and Azerbaijani media on their respective 
authorities, with public debate in both countries being 
conditioned by the stances of the leadership. On the 
other hand, however, it should be noted that activists 
from the Armenian Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA) 
have continued to call for an end to the prolongation 
of the government-supported “image of the enemy” 
and the fear which it brings about. Seven hundred 
civil society representatives took part in HCA’s Fifth 
Annual Congress in 2000 in Azerbaijan in which 20 
Armenians from undisputed Armenia and 21 from 
Nagorno Karabakh were present. 
3.1.1 Identity/Ethnicity  
 
Armenian National Identity – The Place of 
Nagorno Karabakh
In Armenia, the revival of the public debate on the 
1915 Armenian Genocide by Ottoman Turks has 
led to this latter tragedy becoming associated with 
more recent events in Armenian history, such as 
the pogrom of Sumgait in 1998 and the situation 
of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh. Through the 
Nagorno Karabakh movement (1988-1990), the 
image of “a victim pleading for mercy and justice” 
was gradually replaced with that of “a warrior who 
had realised the fact that national goals could be only 
achieved through struggle.”12 
Following the conflict, the issue continued to 
be connected with the project of national state 
building due to the suffering Armenia had endured 
in the conflict. Beginning with Robert Kocharyan’s 
presidency in 1998, which was supported primarily by 
the Dashnaktsutiun party, the Armenian authorities 
took a view on the conflict which was closely related 
to the “HayDat” ideology, which states that Nagorno 
Karabakh is historically Armenian land and that its 
unification with Armenia is a matter of restoring 
historical justice.13 This discourse, however, is not 
entirely shared by the elites and the societies in 
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh (according to public 
opinion surveys, for example, the population in 
Nagorno Karabakh is split between those favouring 
union with Armenia and a narrow majority which 
favours independence14). 
“Ancient Hatred”/Images of the Enemy
 
 Whilst the tragic events on both sides are still part 
of the public discourse being analysed by various 
historians and other experts, the focus is too often 
placed upon disputing numbers and responsibilities 
(between the Soviet Union and the opposing side) 
than upon acknowledging one’s own role in the tragic 
events.
War memories being kept alive by new tragic events, 
such as the murder of an Armenian officer by an 
Azerbaijani counterpart at a Partnership for Peace 
NATO exercise in Budapest, Hungary in 200415, or 
like infighting between Azerbaijani and Armenian 
students in Moscow in 2007, show that the collective 
memories and the image of the enemy remain a social 
factor that needs to be dealt with if any reconciliation 
approach is to be pursued. 
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the “reconciliation” constituencies or through the 
increased presence of the “war parties” (the Karabakh 
Liberation Organisation, the radi cal nationalist 
Azerbaijani “Popular Front” in Azerbaijan and the 
influential “Yerkrapah”, which brings together 
former volunteers who participated in the fighting 
in Nagorno Karabakh) in the public debate.24  They 
point increasingly to the need for radical solutions 
ranging from the recognition of Nagorno Karabakh by 
Armenia (“Yerkrapah”) to the liberation of territories 
through the use of military force (Karabakh Liberation 
Organisation) in Azerbaijan.
 
The public debate in Armenia on the issues related 
to Nagorno Karabakh is limited. Whilst it publicly 
acknowledges that the conflict could be resolved 
peacefully only through compromise, there is little 
internal agreement on what this compromise could 
be. In Armenia, the compromise is considered to 
be the withdrawal from the occupied territories of 
Azerbaijan (the security belt), provided that sufficient 
guarantees are given for the security of the region 
(the corridors linking Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia 
and clear modalities for establishing the status of 
the region through a referendum).  The positions of 
both sides, in fact, remain irreconcilable as Armenia 
insists on a referendum taking place only in Nagorno 
Karabakh, which most probably would reconfirm the 
independence objective of the predominant Armenian 
population. Azerbaijan considers its territorial 
integrity as uncompromisable, especially since the oil 
boom might lead to changes in the balance of power 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
 
Diverging views at the core of the conflict
Of further special interest are the diverging views 
on the issues at the core of the conflict. Whilst most 
Azerbaijani experts consider the conflict to have two 
key factors: Armenian irredentism and the Russian 
policy of control through supporting the freezing 
of the conflict, Armenian experts point at the right 
to self-determination and the lack of guarantees 
for achieving this right within the current political 
structures of Azerbaijan. The stumbling block in 
negotiations remains the official status of Nagorno 
Karabakh and the fact that that its de facto authorities 
are not involved in the negotiations.  The change of 
power in Armenia in 1998 changed the public image of 
the conflict as a struggle for self-determination, to that 
of an inter-state conflict, since Armenian President 
Robert Kocharyan, a descendent of Karabakh, agreed 
to the bilateral format of negotiations considering 
that he will also represent the Karabakh Armenians 
3.1.2 Political Factors
Soviet Political Institutions and Legacy
In the opinion of Armenian experts, the policy of the 
central authorities of the former Soviet Union and 
the corrupt administration of the Soviet Republics 
were two factors which account for the roots of the 
conflict.19 Another is the timing and sequence of 
events preceding the conflict and Moscow’s response 
to these events, which according to some experts have 
led to the eruption of the conflict. The role of Moscow 
in fuelling the conflict is pointed out in Yerevan – the 
role of the Soviet military and the selling of equipment 
to both sides, the Kremlin’s inability to respond 
quickly and rapidly to the pogroms in Sumgait, 
Ganja, Baku and its inability to cope with increasing 
tension in the area. Some Armenian experts refer 
to the collapse of the central command and control 
system of the Soviet Union and the “privatisation” of 
manpower and equipment for the local interests of 
military commanders as destabilising factors.20  Some 
journalists, like Thomas de Waal, show, through their 
analysis of Soviet archives and interviews with key 
players, that Soviet leaders in Moscow were “running 
to keep pace with the dispute, rather than leading 
it.”21  
Political Structures of the Newly Independent States
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict has played an 
important role in the internal politics of Armenia. The 
limited legitimacy of the Armenian authorities and 
the limited development of democratic institutions, 
contribute to the conflict being used for the internal 
political consumption of for instance the change 
of power (the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrosyan 
in 1998) and the government’s control over public 
debate.
In both Azerbaijan and Armenia, conflict resolution is 
considered to be a ‘restricted’ area of policy making, 
which is only limited to a certain circle of people. For 
example, President Ter-Petrosyan declared that only 
six people are competent actors that could deal with 
the complexity of the Nagorno Karabakh problem.22 
Less than a dozen officials in both countries (Armenia 
and Azerbaijan) are involved in the process on a full-
time basis, while experts in the region are kept at a 
distance and there is little debate within society.23 
The lack of democratic development has also meant 
that the policy of the government remains publicly 
unchallenged, either through the marginalisation of 
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blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and upon 
increased energy revenues in Azerbaijan.  
In Armenia, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth in 2007 was 13.8 percent, with similar rates 
having been registered over the last six years.  The 
business climate has improved, with official figures 
indicating that poverty has decreased to less than 25 
percent as compared to 55 percent in the mid-1990s.32 
There are, however, questions with regards to the 
sustainability of the growth. The recent economic 
growth was largely driven by investment and increased 
consumer spending, and supported by remittances 
and increased private sector incomes wherein the 
shadow economy remains large (estimated at about 
30 percent of GDP). Construction has been the most 
dynamic economic sector,33 and where the country 
enjoys lower market prices of Russian natural gas. 
Moreover, the influence of the stratum of oligarchs 
in Armenia’s economic and political life remains a 
worrying reality.  Additionally, the conflict enables 
Armenia to solicit huge financial input from its 
diaspora and various Western governments.  The 
US, for example, which is home to a significantly 
large portion of the diaspora community, allocated 
USD 1,630 million between 1992-2008 for the 
“consolidation of democracy.”  
With regards to possible incentives for reaching a 
compromise, some studies show that opening the 
borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan could lead to 
an increase of trade of 30 percent (according to a 
World Bank study), with Azerbaijan itself being able 
to gain approximately 5 percent of GDP. These data, 
however, are challenged by local governmental and 
non-governmental experts, with a governmental 
study from Armenia arguing that opening the borders 
with Turkey and Azerbaijan will not in fact influence 
the GDP of Armenia to a significant degree.  Experts 
on both sides agree that the possibilities for using 
economic incentives to facilitate a political solution 
to the conflict are limited, due to oil resources, 
monopolistic market structures and the political 
power of oligarchs who prioritise their political gains 
over general economic development.
   
under the aegis of the Minsk Group.25 The lack of 
agreement on the issues at the core of the conflict, 
therefore, has also led to ambiguities with regards to 
the official status of parties to the conflict and their 
participation in the negotiation format.
Militarisation and the Possibility of the Resumption 
of Hostilities
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are increasing their 
military forces.  Armenia’s military budget for 2007 
was USD 280 million, which is approximately one-
fourth of Azerbaijan’s 2007 military budget.  The 
Armenian armed forces have an estimated 60,000 
troops and its army service is traditionally seen as a 
matter of honour associated with the heroic image 
of the army in society.26  The army represents the 
most trusted Armenian institution, together with the 
Church, with the level of trust in the army being at 81 
percent in December 2007 whilst national trust in the 
media, in the Office of the President, and in political 
parties, was  respectively 66, 53 and 42 percent.27 
Armenia assists Karabakh financially, in the form of 
interstate loans, and trains Karabakh’s military.28
The increased militarisation of the parties to the 
conflict, coupled with a rise in the number of 
violations of the cease-fire as well as of the number of 
people killed as a consequence, creates a very serious 
possibility for the resumption of hostilities.  Both 
parties make a calculation of the costs and benefits 
of using armed force. Armenian experts say the 
Azerbaijani military, although it might be ineffective 
and marred by corruption,29still controls the strategic 
positions in Karabakh. In Nagorno Karabakh, 
everyone is ready for war and there is no fear of 
Azerbaijan. Although there is no desire to start any 
military action, Karabakh is ready and increasing its 
capacity to defend itself.30 Cease-fire violations of the 
scale of the March 2008 events (which, according to 
some experts, were similar to a full-fledged military 
confrontation with heavy equipment) show that there 
is a high risk of a possible escalation of events. 31 
Economic Costs and Benefits of the Conflict
Political calculations regarding a possible 
strengthening or weakening of Armenia’s negotiation 
positions are based upon its continued economic 
growth, which it realised despite living under a 
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Karabakh conflict in its relations with both Armenia 
and Azerbaijan.37 In a region such as the South 
Caucasus, wherein foreign policy is largely defined 
and practised in terms of geopolitical and power 
interests, the EU’s soft power potential has only 
gradually been recognised, and only by a limited 
elite. The EU has therefore as of yet not been able 
to contribute to important political and democratic 
reforms in either country and its influence remains 
peripheral, even if slightly increasing. France for the 
most part represents the EU in negotiations.  
Turkey
Turkey’s approach towards the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict is influenced by its relations with Russia, 
the Turkic-speaking countries of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, the Middle-East, the Kurdish question, 
as well as European integration issues.  In the 
Caucasus, Turkey has as one of its strategic objectives 
the strengthening of its positions in the region and 
Central Asia by deepening economic, political, cultural 
and even military relations with the Turkic-speaking 
former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan.  The 
closure of the border between Armenia and Turkey 
in open support to Azerbaijan, the lack of diplomatic 
relations and the Turkish refusal to recognize the 
1915 Armenian Genocide, add to the complexity of 
Turkey’s policies in the Caucasus.
 
Turkey recognised Armenia’s independence in 1991, 
but no diplomatic relations were established, with 
Ankara closing the border with Armenia in 1993. 
As part of the European integration process (the 
European Parliament’s report requesting that Turkey 
opens the border with Armenia), there has been an 
increase of public declarations and speculations on 
the possibilities of reopening the border between 
Armenia and Turkey, most notably in 2008, although 
similar declarations took place in 2004 without any 
concrete implications. International experts state 
that a reopening of the border with Armenia would 
transform Anatolia into a “crossroad of north-south 
and east-west trade in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia and contribute to the development of Eastern 
Turkey.38
Iran
Iran has a policy of maintaining the balance of 
power between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  A powerful 
Azerbaijan is perceived as an increasing threat due to 
the large Azerbaijani minority in Iran but, at the same 
time, it supports the principle of territorial integrity. 
3.1.3 Geopolitical Level
Russia
 
Russia, as a Minsk Group co-chair, supports the 
Minsk process and UN resolutions. The current 
Russian co-chairman is Yuri Merzlyakov. 
Russia’s interests in the region and its fear of 
instability keep its role in the conflict ambiguous 
and problematic. Whilst Russia benefits from the 
status quo (Armenia’s participation in the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military base 
in Armenia, the take-over of important sectors of the 
Armenian economy34), it is also becoming increasingly 
interested in Azerbaijan, due to the development of 
alternative routes for energy transportation from 
the Caspian Basin (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipline 
(BTC)) and its present discussions on gas pipelines 
such as Nabucco. This notwithstanding, evaluations 
with regards to Russia’s role in the resolution of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict differ. Armenian experts 
express doubt in the idea of Russia as the key to 
resolving the conflict.35       
United States
 
The US is involved in the conflict as a co-chair, along 
with Russia and France, of the Minsk Group. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, US policy was perceived by 
Azerbaijanis as being overly pro-Armenian due to 
Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Act prohibiting 
all US government aid to the Government of 
Azerbaijan until the American President determines 
that Azerbaijan has taken “demonstrable steps to 
cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force 
against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.”  The Act 
was waved only in 2001. Still, Armenia receives large 
amounts of US aid. Since 1993 the US has provided 
nearly USD 2 billion in assistance to Armenia, 
making it the highest per capita recipient of US aid 
in the NIS (Newly Independent States).36 Recently 
however, US policy is considered to be increasingly 
pro-Azerbaijani as a result of its oil resources, access 
to the Caspian Basin and strategic interests related 
to the Middle-East (i.e. Iran).  Experts on both sides, 
however, agree that the US favours a status quo policy 
at the present, as it does not have the needed leverage 
to facilitate a solution of the conflict and, therefore, 
focuses on containing the conflict and preventing the 
re-escalation of hostilities.
European Union
The EU has mostly avoided addressing the Nagorno-
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political crisis whilst Armenia says that Azerbaijan 
tried to break the cease-fire line and catch Armenia 
by surprise42). It is true, however, that collegial 
mutual contacts between soldiers on both sides of the 
conflict exist, although physical confrontations and 
shootings still occur. There has been no independent 
investigation of the violation by the international 
community, including the OSCE. Why this is the 
case, remains a question up to today. The magnitude 
of this incident shows that while the self-regulating 
cease-fire seemed to have been working properly 
so far – even if it means that no development was 
possible in the area, which had  the appearance of a 
war zone, and with a significant number of casualties 
on all sides - some  steps should be taken to build 
confidence and to diminish the possibility of an 
escalation of unintended incidents (fires, accidental 
shootings).  
Minsk Process (international negotiation)
The official negotiations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan take place under the aegis of the OSCE 
Minsk Process which is being facilitated by Russia, 
the US and France as co-chairs.  So far, the co-chairs 
have presented different proposals, consisting of 
step-by-step solutions or package deals, but have 
unfortunately not been able to reconcile the positions 
and the interests of the parties. Armenia considers 
the security of Nagorno Karabakh of paramount 
importance and will only feel it is ensured if a clear 
criterion for defining the final status of the region is 
agreed upon from the beginning. This includes the 
guaranteed security of the corridors linking Nagorno 
Karabakh and Armenia via Berdzor and Karvachar 
regions (Lachin and Kelbajar). 
In July 2006, the co-chairs of the Minsk process 
presented the proposal under discussion for the 
first time to the public, possibly frustrated by, and 
in response to, the differences between the secret 
negotiations and public declarations of the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani officials.  Their statement did not 
specify any important details of the so-called “package 
deal”, especially the exact modalities in which the 
referendum on Nagorno Karabakh’s status would 
take place. However, they tended to agree that the 
referendum should take place only on the territory 
of Nagorno Karabakh.43  Presently, it seems that 
negotiations are taking place on a package similar 
to the one proposed in 2006 and, unsurprisingly, 
within expert circles there are little expectations for 
a real breakthrough in the negotiations (despite the 
optimistic declarations of the Minsk Group’s co-
chairs).
Iran is contributing to the diversification of energy 
resources in Armenia (gas pipeline, electricity power 
line) and ensures a much needed transportation 
corridor.  Furthermore, Iran has tried to mediate in 
1992 during the Nagorno Karabakh war, but gave up 
after May 1992. More recently, in March 2009, Iran 
expressed its willingness to mediate a settlement 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh.39 
3.1.4 Capacities for Containing the Conflict 
and Capacities for Peace 
The status quo of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is 
preserved through the involvement of international 
actors in the negotiation process, the self-regulating 
cease-fire which is based upon high levels of military 
presence on both sides and by the perceived economic 
and political costs of changing the status quo (which 
have been discussed above).
Self-regulating Cease-fire
As there are no international peacekeeping forces in 
the conflict area, the cease-fire is maintained by the 
parties involved and is supported by a heavy military 
presence, mines and trenches.  The OSCE carries 
out monitoring of the LOC (line of contact) through 
regular visits which are announced in advance.  There 
is, however, very little communication between the 
sides in order to ensure that unintended incidents do 
not escalate or that certain cooperation takes place 
in the interest of both sides, such as the fighting of 
fires, for example, which are quite frequent in the 
conflict area during summer and which could also 
lead to exploding mines. Some attempts have been 
made at providing assistance to both parties, by for 
instance providing fire-fighting equipment with the 
possibilities for a direct ‘hotline’ of communication 
between commanders, 40 or by proposing cooperation 
on pest control with benefits for both sides and the 
exchange of information regarding non-strategic 
minefields.41  At the moment, however, the Azerbaijani 
side refuses any form of engagement with Nagorno 
Karabakhi authorities. This has negative effects for 
all parties to the conflict in terms of human casualties 
and economic costs.
 
The number of violations of the cease-fire has recently 
increased with one of the most important escalations 
taking place on 4-5 March 2008, both sides blaming 
the other (Azerbaijan says that Armenia provoked 
the incident to draw attention from the internal 
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(small and medium business are under-developed, 
especially in Azerbaijan, and do not have the leverage 
for influencing the political level of the conflict, as 
they are not able to become a strong middle class and 
influence elections at any level).  
Media
Freedom House, an international human rights 
watchdog, defined Armenia’s press as being “not 
free” whilst further indicating that although 
the government does not exert direct control or 
censorship over the media, it does maintain a firm 
grip on broadcast media in particular, through 
informal pressure on outlet owners.46  Armenia has 
14 radio and 42 television stations, most of which 
are privately operated.  The print media is mostly 
privately-owned and expresses a wide variety of 
views without restriction. Private television stations 
generally offer news coverage of a good technical 
quality although the substantive quality of news 
reporting on television and radio does vary.  Most 
stations are owned by pro-government politicians or 
well-connected businessmen, prompting journalists 
to engage in self-censorship.  All Armenian television 
and radio stations avoid editorial commentary or 
critical reports about the government.47
 
Due to the fact that authorities control what goes 
on in the media, especially at the level of electronic 
media, and journalists often exercise self-censorship, 
there is very limited public space for the discussion of 
issues related to conflict resolution which contradict 
the government’s official position. Some experts state 
that many of the media campaigns asking for radical 
measures, uncompromising positions and portraying 
people who have direct contacts with Armenians as 
enemies or spies of the government, are conducted 
at the express request of authorities in Azerbaijan.48 
As illustrated, through monitoring media in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan in 2004 and 2005, media acts more 
as a channel for reinforcing negative stereotypes than 
as a resource for reconciliation. 
NGOs
 
In Armenia, international NGOs (USAID, NGO 
Index, Freedom House, Nations in Transition) make 
mention of some positive developments with regards 
to the legal environment regulating the activity of 
NGOs, better co-operation with the government 
and the involvement of local business.  The NGO 
sector, however, may at times be viewed from pro-
governmental and pro-opposition positions and 
perspectives, with only limited positive change taking 
place regarding the transparency and accountability 
 The Minsk Group has been criticised by all parties 
for “not leading so much to peace but, rather, 
following the conflict sides,44 lacking impartiality 
and neutrality (with Russia and France perceived by 
Azerbaijan as being pro-Armenian) and not having 
any real (or ready to use) incentives or sanctions at 
its disposal for facilitating compromise.45 While 
discussions, for example, are taking place as regards 
the possibility of Russia intervening for the resolution 
of the conflict, provided that a deal with Azerbaijan is 
agreed upon concerning the import of all Azerbaijani 
gas (Medvedev’s visit to Baku in July 2008), most of 
the experts on both sides agree that the status quo is 
presently much more preferable for Russia.  
For the US, the experts seem to consider that the 
status quo is also the preferred solution due to energy 
interests balanced by the Armenian lobby as well as 
the attention primarily paid by the US to the Middle 
East.    
Reconciliation Capacities in societies of the region
Reconciliation capacities on the local level in three 
societies are weak and largely under-used due to 
the blockages at the political level by ruling elites. 
The economic and transport blockade is aggravated 
by the lack of political will from Azerbaijani 
leadership to initiate any kind of cooperation. As a 
direct consequence, mutual problems affecting all 
parties involved in the conflict (Nagorno Karabakh, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia), such as water pollution and 
natural disasters, are not being dealt with efficiently. 
Since 2001, the Karabakh side has on several occasions 
initiated implementing a list of confidence building 
measures concerning the sharing of water resources 
for agricultural and other purposes, fire fighting and 
other natural disasters through the OSCE Minsk 
Group co-chairs. However, the Azerbaijani side has 
rejected this initiative. Only very limited cooperation 
exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan within the 
framework of regional initiatives, such as the Regional 
Environmental Centre in Tbilisi. As discussed above, 
the economic incentives for cooperation are limited, 
and the Azerbaijani blockade is one of the bargaining 
tools. 
At the society level, attempts have been made 
to establish contact between people, both at 
the grassroots level and the middle level of the 
population.  Media and civil society are the key 
resources for reconciliation at the society level 
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to let countries provide assistance to the people 
in Nagorno Karabakh52 – represents such a move. 
The resolution was criticised by the co-chairs and 
Armenia for not representing a step towards conflict 
resolution given its support to only one of the parties 
of the conflict.
    
Legitimacy of Elites
In both countries, power is concentrated in the 
hands of a limited number of people who control 
both the political scene and the economic resources. 
An oligarchic system is in place in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, led by elites which depend on their 
control of political power to maintain economic 
status.. The legitimacy of the elites in both countries 
is disputed, especially as elections have again failed 
to meet international democratic standards. This lack 
of legitimacy, as well as the high stakes in controlling 
political power makes it extremely difficult for both 
parties to push for a costly compromise solution.
Changes at the geopolitical level (Russia/US/EU)
The probability that any changes at the geopolitical 
level could have positive effects upon conflict 
resolution in the short term is quite low. Even more, 
the relationship between the big powers tends to 
become more confrontational in the area, as can 
be seen in the case of neighbouring Georgia. EU’s 
normative power, if correctly applied, could possibly 
lead to significant changes in the region in the 
medium to long term although this still needs to gain 
critical speed.  
Nagorno Karabakh’s Position
The general and widely perpetuated error committed 
by many experts in many papers and publications is 
the fact that Nagorno Karabakh is not considered as 
a separate entity and a phenomenon by itself.  This is 
a factor which should be taken into serious account. 
In reality, the conflict is not between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan; it is between Nagorno Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan. This is the trap and, moreover, what 
is most interesting is that perhaps many have 
understood this in the past, but are forgetting it 
when they ask why the conflict resolution process is 
not working. Armenians in Armenia, it can be said, 
will never dare to take the responsibility of deciding 
the destiny of Nagorno Karabakh from Karabakh 
Armenians. They want to help, but will never take 
the decision. Nagorno Karabakh should at least be 
recognised as a side to the conflict and be treated as 
such, for the sake of bringing about real progress and 
reaching a true and sustainable solution.
of the national government.
In Nagorno Karabakh, the civil society sector remains 
very weak with only a few NGOs active at the policy 
level (i.e. Stepanakert Press Club, Helsinki Initiative-
92).  The NGO sector has a quite limited support from 
international actors (with the exception of Diaspora 
organisations) with regard to capacity building 
or single community programmes, mainly due to 
the fact that Azerbaijani policies have discouraged 
such initiatives.  This situation, therefore, affects 
any intended EU initiative dealing with Nagorno 
Karabakh. The EU itself has repeatedly stated  that it 
cannot have any relations with Nagorno Karabakh,49 
which it views as an illegal entity.50 However, 
considering the Nagorno Karabakh leadership as 
party to the conflict would be an important step for 
the EU to profile itself as a fair mediator. 
3.2  Dynamics in the Last Years
Missed Opportunities (the potential for official 
negotiations)
Windows of opportunities were perceived by 
mediators and observers in 1997, 1998, 2001 and 
2006, when it seemed as though the sides were close 
to a comprehensive settlement. The optimism shown 
by mediators, however, seemed unjustified. There 
was often no agreement on the more difficult issues 
(status and security guarantees), or the formula 
agreed upon (under the step-by-step approach) 
was considered only from the position of further 
strengthening the bargaining position. After 1998, 
the negotiation process largely stagnated and the 
impetus of 1994-1996 was lost as the perception 
of a “hurting stalemate” diminished, due to the 
economic growth in Armenia and Azerbaijan.51 At 
present, the negotiations still require a serious move 
from managing the consequences of the war (IDPs, 
occupied territories, closure of borders) to the real 
issues (Nagorno Karabakhi status and security 
guarantees).
The Minsk Group seemed to have exhausted the 
possible options for a conflict resolution (package 
deal, step-by-step, swap of territories, intermediary 
status). Azerbaijan is increasingly looking for 
alternative options to reconfirm its position, especially 
in light of Kosovo’s independence in 2008. The 
UNGA resolution of 14 March 2008, reconfirming 
the organisation’s commitment to Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity and the immediate, complete and 
unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from 
the territory of Azerbaijan in order to allow for the 
return of  refugees – as well as Azerbaijan’s refusal 
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EUR 98.4 million for 2007-2010 based upon three 
priority areas: democracy and good governance (EUR 
29.52 million), regulatory reform and administrative 
capacity building (EUR 29.52 million), as well as 
support for poverty reduction (EUR 39.36 million).55 
For 2007, the ENPI annual allocation was 21 
million EUR for strengthening good governance 
and democratic development, supporting regulatory 
reforms and supporting Armenia’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy.56
 
From the EU Member States, the main bilateral 
donors are:  France (support to university 
education, culture and health care), Germany (one 
of the biggest bilateral donors, promoting local 
self-governance, judicial reform and the rule of law, 
vocational training, infrastructure development, 
such as the rehabilitation of water systems, and 
electricity transmission), Sweden (promotes local 
self-governance, judicial reform and the rule of law, 
rural development, vocational training, Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SME) development and the 
promotion of mortgage lending), Greece (health care 
and education, telecommunications and business 
training), the Netherlands (macro support, human 
rights and good governance) and the UK (regional 
development, public sector reform and improving 
public expenditure planning mechanisms).57
 
Finally, the OSCE is actively fighting corruption and 
trafficking, and provides support for democratisation, 
electoral reform, environment, media, human rights 
and the rule of law in Armenia.
4.2  Mapping of the Main Initiatives 
on Conflict Resolution and 
Peace-Building
Most of the initiatives for conflict resolution supported 
by international actors are in the field of managing the 
consequences of the war (humanitarian assistance for 
refugees and IDPs, missing persons, prisoners of war). 
Some initiatives have taken place with regards to the 
media, cooperation between NGOs, and economic 
research, as well as in the security field, for instance 
demining (non-strategic mines) and monitoring the 
cease-fire line.  There is only very limited engagement 
in Nagorno Karabakh itself with the US as the only 
international actor providing direct humanitarian aid 
(USD 5 million annually).58
The key actors in the conflict resolution process are 
the UN agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHA and 
4  INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSES
4.1  Main International Donors 
- International Assistance to 
Armenia
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
EBRD (completing eight investments in Armenia, 
totalling 116 million EUR in 2005), the World 
Bank (commitments of USD 398.6 million in 2006 
focusing on social reforms, business climate, sectoral 
credits in energy, transport, water, education and 
improvement of the country’s investment climate), 
as the key international financial institutions, have 
programmes or pooled resources to support poverty 
reduction, restructure the energy sector, strengthen 
the financial sector and provide support to Small 
and Medium Enterprises  in Armenia.  The UNDP 
provides assistance in many sectors related to 
economic development, information technologies 
and decentralisation. In particular, it is assisting 
the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development 
in elaborating a 20-year Economic Development 
Plan.53
The overall goal of the USAID in Armenia for 
2009-2013 is to support “sustainable development 
through increased competitiveness, higher quality 
social services and a more empowered civil society” 
based upon three objectives:  good governance and 
democracy, investing in people and economic growth, 
as well as the peace and reconciliation processes.54 
USAID assistance reached USD 65 million in 2005, 
USD 63.79 million in 2007 and an estimated USD 
62.39 million in 2008.  In addition, Armenia is 
eligible to currently receive USD 235.6 million under 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding 
for fighting corruption.
Under ENP national allocations, European 
Commission assistance to Armenia is estimated at 
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the conflict divide).  The existing initiatives, however, 
remain fragmented and only marginal to the official 
approach and the public discourse.  
Middle Level:
 Some of the initiatives are dedicated to defining and 
proposing alternative ways of conflict resolution such 
as those based upon reconciliation and dialogue. 
Some examples are:
 
▪ Transcaucasian Dialogue (a network of 
trustbuilding civic initiatives through HCA 
branches in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno 
Karabakh dating to 1992).  Forty Armenians, 
including those from Nagorno Karabakh, 
participated at the HCA General Assembly in 
Baku in November 2000.  The network aims at 
promoting reconciliation and cooperation across 
the conflict divide.  This project has yielded 
some important results in the 1990s, such as the 
exchange of prisoners of war, the identification 
of missing persons and mutual visits. As HCA 
branches are active in the field of human rights 
protection, however, they have little influence 
at the policy level, even if international support 
has at times contributed to some successes in the 
field of human rights protection and democratic 
development.
  
▪ The Dortmund Conference is another 
example of an attempt to involve the middle level 
in the conflict resolution process. Beginning in 
2001, representatives of Azerbaijani, Nagorno 
Karabakhi and Armenian societies (NGO 
activists, former high officials, businessmen, 
academics, representatives of political parties) 
held nine meetings with Russian and American 
members of the working group.  Finally, in May 
2006, the working group produced a matrix of 
a framework agreement which suggested a step-
by-step approach consisting of two phases.  The 
document was submitted for consideration to 
the leaders of the conflicting sides as well as to 
the Minsk Group. However, no response was 
received.
▪ Other initiatives discuss possibilities for a 
change of paradigm in dealing with conflicts 
and nationalist discourses in the countries of the 
South Caucasus by proposing a certain degree of 
integration based upon Europeanisation.  Such 
an initiative was supported by the Westminster 
Foundation in 2005-2006, which included 
representatives from all three South Caucasian 
UNIFEM), the OSCE and some state donors such 
as the US, the UK, Germany, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland.  Some private foundations, such as the 
Eurasia Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
and the Open Society Institute, for example, are also 
active in this field, as well as international NGOs 
such as the CMI, International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF).  The UK, for example, has promoted an 
interesting approach through the Consortium 
Initiative which has separate strands of work:  civil 
society (International Alert), media (Conciliation 
Resources), co-ordination of international 
development organisations (Catholic Relief Services) 
and LINKS (Parliamentary cooperation).  The aim 
was to have a more coordinated and comprehensive 
approach towards working with the media and 
towards development and humanitarian issues at 
political and societal level. Conciliation Resources, 
however, as one of the member organisations, left the 
Consortium Initiative after one year, and so its work 
remains to be perceived as not entirely achieving 
the intended outcome even if some good initial 
outputs were produced (Conciliation Resources’ 
documentaries, the International Alert’s economy 
and conflict research59). 
4.2.1 Governance and Politics
 
A number of limited and fragmented initiatives have 
taken place at the political level with regards to the 
promotion of informal dialogue at the grassroots and 
middle levels, support for the protection of human 
rights, encouraging civil society-governmental co-
operation, the media and political participation of the 
IDPs.  Some initiatives have taken place at the policy 
level, for instance the improvement of accountability 
and transparency, the opening of public debate and 
societal participation, mediation and reconciliation 
initiatives.
Moreover, most of the initiatives that have taken 
place to support dialogue between the parties to the 
conflict have occurred either between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan or within regional frameworks (South 
Caucasus, Black Sea region).  
Two categories of past and current initiatives should 
be discussed in particular; that is, those which engage 
the middle level of the population by including 
opinion makers from academic circles, think tanks, 
NGOs at the policy level and governmental experts 
and working with media (in each country and across 
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countries and the break-away republics. This 
initiative led to the formation of a standing 
conference of citizens of the South Caucasus for 
Peace, Democracy and Regional Integration.  At 
the present, the initiative enjoys some limited 
support from international donors (on aspects 
related to democratic transformation and 
economic integration).60
▪ Academic approach: Further initiatives 
have involved joint academic research (very 
limited and not based upon joint evaluations but 
separate ones) and the training of politicians, 
governmental and non-governmental experts in 
conflict management and peacebuilding. These 
projects were mostly undertaken by international 
organisations, and were sometimes promoted by 
local organisations (such as various Baku and 
Yerevan-based think tanks).
Media:
Several initiatives have taken place in the last years 
dealing with conflict issues in the context of regional 
frameworks. There were also attempts to cooperate 
directly with the parties to the conflict alone.  Some 
of those initiatives, such as the cooperation between 
the Yerevan and Baku press clubs, have been 
undertaken without international facilitation. They 
included activities such as discussions on the role of 
the media in each of the countries and the role of the 
media in conflict resolution, training sessions, media 
monitoring, editing joint magazines or books, as well 
as producing joint documentaries and television 
shows.  Some of the more notable programmes are: 
▪ Caucasus Media Support Project (1997-
2000) which was supported by the Swiss 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and organised not 
only 12 conferences and training sessions for 200 
participants, but also the first visits of Armenian 
and Azerbaijani journalists to Armenia, Nagorno 
Karabakh and Azerbaijan.
▪ The Eurasia Foundation’s South Caucasus 
Co-operation Programme (SCCP), which 
ran from 1998, supported cross-border 
cooperation between the region’s leading media 
outlets, advocacy organisations and university 
journalism departments through a targeted 
grants competition. The SCCP awarded grants 
to support five trilateral partnerships between 
media organisations from Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia which covered the following areas: 
strengthening links between the journalism 
departments of three prominent universities 
through student and faculty exchanges, 
monitoring the television news coverage of events 
in the neighbouring countries with  particular 
focus upon the use of stereotypical language, 
creating a joint newspaper for the border areas of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; developing a 
region-wide network of analytical journalists and 
monitoring and assessing the media coverage of 
law enforcement issues in the South Caucasian 
countries.
 
▪ The Caucasus Journalists (or Caucasus 
Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development 
(CIPDD)), together with the Committee to 
Protect Journalists in Azerbaijan (Ruh) and 
the Association of Investigative Journalists of 
Armenia, worked to create a common information 
network in the South Caucasus. To that end, the 
partner organisations set up a joint website for 
journalists in the three countries of the South 
Caucasus (http://caucasusjournalists.org) as a 
tool for networking, cooperating and gathering 
and exchanging information. Approximately 145 
journalists and 22 publishers became members 
of the South Caucasus Network through the 
framework of this project.  The network provided 
specific services to participating journalists such 
as, for example, arranging online interviews for 
them with important public figures.
▪ The Institute of War and Peace Reporting’s 
(IWPR) Cross Caucasus Journalism Network 
offered independent journalists from the 
breakaway regions as well as the North Caucasian 
republics trainings on conflict resolution, 
professional journalism and minority reporting.
▪ The Yerevan and Baku  Press Clubs (with 
the support of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) 
monitored Armenian and Azerbaijani press 
between 2005-2006 and have worked together 
to jointly publish a book entitled The Karabagh 
Conflict: Towards Understanding Each Other. 
Together with the Stepanakert Press Club, both 
press clubs also cooperated  in a project entitled 
“At a Crossroads: No Peace, No War”, aimed at 
providing an accurate picture of the stereotypes 
which are both propagandised and widely held 
amongst Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. 
It was facilitated in 2004-2005 by the Regional 
Research Centre for Investigative Journalists 
(Armenia) in partnership with the Institute of 
Peace and Democracy (Azerbaijan).
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Foundation’s programmes on Armenian-Turkish 
relations), these initiatives have hitherto had only 
limited impact on Azerbaijani-Armenian relations. 
Owing to its good macro-economic performance 
over the last years, Armenia does not see economic 
benefits as possibly off-setting the political costs of the 
conflict.  As for the Armenian-Turkish track, it could 
be said that Track II initiatives have strengthened 
the call of those interested in the normalisation of 
relations. There are unofficial economic contacts 
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Georgia 
(such as the Sadakhlo market), but they have limited 
impact at macro-economic and political level. Also, 
key agents at the Sadakhlo market have little interest 
in the normalisation of trade relations between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as this will negatively affect 
their business.61 
Various environmental initiatives have been presented 
in order to encourage some limited communication 
and cooperation between the conflicting parties. The 
OSCE, for example, has proposed two initiatives: one 
on water management (the maintenance and operation 
of reservoirs in the Nagorno Karabakh region and the 
rehabilitation of downstream irrigation networks62), 
and another on fire-fighting in the conflict areas (the 
OSCE-led environmental assessment mission to 
fire-affected territories in and around the Nagorno 
Karabakh region proposed measures to combat the 
detrimental consequences of the fires and to enhance 
national capacities to prevent and control similar 
incidents in the future63). So far however, Azerbaijan 
has obstructed a successful implementation of 
these initiatives, by refusing to engage the Nagorno 
Karabakh leadership and accusing the Karabakhi 
side of arson.  
4.2.4 Social
Most of the international interventions related to 
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict have a  social or 
humanitarian character. Focusing on humanitarian 
assistance and rehabilitation, rather than development 
and democratisation, several NGOs have established 
a permanent field presence in Nagorno Karabakh. 
Main examples include the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Médecins sans frontières, Save the 
Children, and various diaspora groups.
IDPs / Refugees
Since 1992, the UNCHR has been helping the 
Armenian Government to address the needs of 
approximately 220,000 Armenian refugees from 
▪ Conciliation Resources worked on media 
issues related to the conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, participating for instance within the 
framework of the Consortium Initiative, a UK-
supported initiative for the resolution of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  Their last project, 
“Dialogue through Film”, began in 2006 and 
trained five young journalists from Azerbaijan and 
five from Nagorno Karabakh to enable them to 
produce short films for broadcast.  An additional 
ten journalists joined the project in 2007. The 
project is a collaboration of Conciliation Resources 
and Internews Armenia, Internews Azerbaijan 
and the Stepanakert Press Club within the 
framework of the Consortium Initiative.  The idea 
is that the films will be shown to both Armenian 
and Azerbaijani audiences, although there is no 
guarantee that this will indeed take place.
4.2.2 Security (military and human security)
Only a limited number of initiatives has been 
undertaken in the field of both military and non-
military security..Whilst some support in security 
sector reform is taking place in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
within the framework of cooperation with NATO 
(IPAP) or based upon bilateral assistance projects 
(US, mainly), the military remains one of the sectors 
in which accountability and transparency are most 
restricted (for instance, anti-corruption initiatives 
in both countries include neither corruption in the 
armed forces nor procurement).  Civilian control 
over the military forces, especially from the part of 
the Parliament, is almost non-existent. In the present 
conditions of hardening positions and militarisation, 
this is a concerning situation, which should be of key 
interest to international actors. 
With regards to border management, the EU 
programme on supporting Integrated Border 
Management (IBM) in the South Caucasus focuses 
only upon Georgian-Armenian cooperation and 
Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation, due to the fact 
that other borders have been closed. 
4.2.3  Economic and Sustainable 
Development
Whereas there have been attempts to research the 
economic costs of the conflict and to propose economic 
incentives in order to facilitate conflict resolution 
(International Alert’s, USAID’s and the Eurasia 
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War and Civilian Internees (POW/CI). It conducts 
visits to ensure their protection under international 
humanitarian law, whilst often providing clothing, 
toiletries and other assistance during these visits. 
Upon the request of and with the full co-operation of 
the government, the ICRC facilitated the transfer of 
four individuals and the repatriation of one person 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the year. 66 
5  CONCLUSIONS AND 
LESSONS LEARNED
The countries of the South Caucasus, de jure 
recognised or not, have their own dynamics and 
characteristics. Not a single organisation, whether it 
is NATO, the OSCE or the EU, will have the solutions 
to all problems here, or elsewhere. But cooperation 
policies will strengthen security – and, eventually, 
stability – for all countries of the region. At present, 
there is a unique chance to turn the South Caucasus 
into a region of cooperation and stability, in which 
every country has its say and considers itself safe. 
Working together, there will be a chance to fully 
understand the interests of all sides involved, which 
would already be an important step towards  overall 
success.
5.1 Relevance
Most cooperative initiatives initiated by international 
donors and civil society are taking place at a regional 
level (Georgia-Armenia-Azerbaijan), and do not 
involve the Karabakhi people.
National elites have  monopolised  most conflict 
resolution processes. The position of Armenia and 
Nagorno Karabakh is that people-to-people contacts 
should take place permanently, and not only after the 
conflict is solved. 
In the 1990s, general post-war rehabilitation 
processes (missing persons, prisoners of war), should 
have been more result-oriented (problem-solving).
There is a need for more grassroots engagement with 
IDPs. More single community programmes should be 
started, in addition to already existing  programmes 
Azerbaijan (figures from 2005).64 Yet, neither the 
UNCHR nor any other international organisation has 
addressed the needs of the refugees who are currently 
residing in Nagorno Karabakh, rather than in one of 
the recognised states. 
Though Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan have 
been subject to integration from the beginning, the 
UNHCR reports that approximately 8,399 IDPs 
continue to live in Armenia and have not been able 
to return to their villages (in the conflict areas) or are 
not interested in going back due to socio-economic 
hardships or the fear of land mines.65 There are 
approximately 10,000 IDPs in Nagorno Karabakh as 
well.
Working on Women’s Issues
The regional “Women for Peace” coalition, sponsored 
by UNIFEM, was established in 2003 and includes 
representatives of women’s coalitions in Armenia 
(Peace Coalition), Georgia (Unity of Women for 
Peace) and Azerbaijan (Coalition 1325).  One of the 
achievements of the initiative is an education manual 
on peace and gender, which should also help to 
address the negative understanding of “peace” (as 
defeatism) among IDPs.  UNIFEM has established 
several programmes aimed at female IDPs, such as the 
2004 project called “Supporting Local Initiatives in 
Maintaining Trans-Border Communication Between 
Women of Azerbaijan and Armenia”, which was 
directed at the mobilisation of women to participate in 
trust building between the divided societies. Women 
IDPs were trained in self-empowerment, and asked 
to organise themselves into a network.  Unfortunately 
however, Azerbaijan’s refusal to grant international 
donors access to Nagorno Karabakh, has resulted in 
a forced exclusion of that region and its citizens from 
this type of regional projects. 
The ICRC continues to process cases of persons 
who went missing in connection with the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict and has worked with the government 
to develop a consolidated list of missing persons from 
the beginning of conflict till nowadays.  According to 
the ICRC, the number of confirmed missing persons 
increased from 4176 to 4416 in 2007, including 3398 
military personnel and 1015 civilians.  The Azerbaijani 
government reported that prisoners of war, hostages, 
and missing persons totalled 4354 at the year’s end. 
The ICRC says that it opened investigations into 
229 new cases during the last year. In addition, it 
continues to pay special attention to Prisoners of 
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fledged dialogues amongst scholars from all sides. 
This lack of objective, unbiased information remains 
a key problem that needs to be addressed by the 
international community.
As compared to the 1990s, civil society organisations 
that are involved in dialogue initiatives are presently 
more open to discuss options for conflict resolution. 
The key public positions, however, have remained 
the same; that is, territorial integrity (Azerbaijan) 
and self-determination that can lead to independence 
(Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia).
There is a limited public awareness of dialogue 
initiatives, or people are afraid of being portrayed 
in a negative way by local media (defeatist/spies/
traitors). Moreover, international organisations often 
refrain from publishing their conflict management-
related activities, referring to the ‘sensitivity’ of the 
issue.
Although Azerbaijani and Armenian news agencies 
continued to exchange information, even when 
political relations were at their worst, the promotion 
of stereotypical enemy images by the media remains 
a main point of concern..
Feeding into the official negotiations: the Dortmund 
conference proposal was made, although it remains 
without answer, and some communication has been 
established between civil society and the co-chairs of 
the Minsk Group (particularly Matthew Bryza, the 
US representative of Minsk Group Chairmanship, 
meets with local experts of all sides on his trips to the 
region). 
Most of the positive impact remains at the personal 
level of the participants of the reconciliation or track 
II diplomacy projects. There is a  need to enlarge the 
circle of experts or professionals, as well as common 
participants of the projects.
5.4 Capacity Issues
With regard to the media, there is a deterioration of 
the overall situation in Armenia, with an environment 
of controlled public debate and information.
NGOs are still based upon the image of one person 
or leader, and there remain numerous concerns 
with regard to the independence of NGOs. This 
is especially the case in Azerbaijan, where the 
government actively and at times financially supports 
the activities of certain NGOs (even radical ones) that 
promote a “patriotic” discourse in relation to Nagorno 
Karabakh.  Furthermore, independent NGOs are 
almost exclusively dependent upon the support of 
international donors, and they have limited access to 
and influence on decision makers.
which focus on inter-community dialogue.
By spreading propaganda which strengthens negative 
stereotypes, the media has taken an important role 
in the conflict. Independent journalism should be 
greatly stimulated.  
The windows of opportunity that were perceived by 
negotiators in official negotiations (such as in 2006), 
have matched with some initiatives at society level 
(the Dortmund conference and the press clubs).  At 
present, there is a generally shared worry that the 
window of opportunity for peaceful resolution is 
closing.
The political establishment (either governmental 
or political parties) hardly participates in initiatives 
involving participants from Nagorno Karabakh. 
Although some MPs participate in dialogue initiatives, 
they only do this at regional level.
Although there is general awareness of the need to 
engage the youth, only very few initiatives exist. 
The ones that have been established, are mainly 
training initiatives, such as the project  called “Living 
Together – Connecting Futures”, supported by the 
British Council. 
There is no common agreement on the question which 
parties there are to the conflict: are those parties 
Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan, or Armenia and 
Azerbaijan? 
5.2 Sustainability
The circle of individuals having contacts on the other 
side is growing at a very slow rate and remains limited 
to no more than a hundred or so members of NGOs. 
Joint projects are frequently not continued on the 
long run because of a ‘’lack of real communication, 
let alone friendship.”  The HCA is the only dialogue 
that is still producing joint initiatives and continuing 
on a regular basis.
Multiple repetitions of projects by various donors lead 
only to establishment of a humanistic relationship 
while there is a strong need for new approaches that 
can lead to sustainability of the projects and ideas.
Some initiatives at times produce spin-offs.
5.3 Gaps/Differences/Needs 
Most conflict resolution analysis is limited to 
historical descriptions. In other cases, polls and 
public opinion surveys are conducted, which face 
the threat of not being published if they do not suit 
the political needs of the ruling regimes. There is 
still a shortage of policy-oriented studies and full-
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6  THE ENP AND THE 
RESOLUTION OF THE 
NAGORNO KARABAKH 
CONFLICT– REALITIES 
AND PERSPECTIVES 
6.1 Review of the EU Approach
The EU has hitherto had little involvement in the 
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, despite 
its attempts at resolving the crisis through the 
application of its ENP Action Plans. As the conflict 
assessment has indicated, many issues at the core of 
the conflict are related to internal issues in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, including 
national identity, the weakness and lack of legitimacy 
of political institutions, and the underutilisation 
of the capacities for positive transformation and 
reconciliation.  As part of the ENP AP implementation, 
however, only some economic and administrative 
reforms have taken place in Armenia, proving only 
mildy effective at  political or society levels.  
The attitude of all parties towards the ENP is quite 
formalistic. The EU pretends that it has a policy, 
whilst governments use this for the internal purpose 
of legitimising their discourse on “European 
integration.”  As ENP implementation is based upon 
the level of ambition of each of the countries – and 
with the governments in both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
being quite reactive – there is little hope for a change 
of approach, unless it is driven by either the EU or 
civil society, in cooperation with parts of the elite in 
the respective countries. 
With regard to the EU involvement in conflict 
resolution, the most important aspect of the two 
ENP Action Plans is the fact that it commits the 
states to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and 
promotes people-to-people contacts as well as the 
involvement of civil society.  The EU, however, 
has hitherto adopted a fragmented approach. The 
failure of several CBMs and cross border initiatives 
Projects seem to work best when they are facilitated 
by external actors who can coordinate the 
implementation process and solve possible problems 
and misunderstandings.
There is distrust of third parties (hidden agenda, pro-
Azerbaijani / pro-Armenian) and a reduced conflict 
sensitivity of third party intervention.
There is very limited coordination and coherence of 
Track II initiatives at the middle level (linkages with 
the grass-roots level).
Projects should be designed with a long-term scope 
and continuity in mind, based upon the understanding 
that peacebuilding is a long process. Programmes 
should continue until the end, whether that would 
require five or 50 years. Any stoppage of the activity 
or engagement is equal to starting over.
Further factors impeding conflict resolution are the 
lack of ‘Best Practices’ units and impact assessment 
mechanisms (due to a shortage of resources), 
together with the lack of policy papers (only general 
outlines for orientation, such as “improving economic 
opportunities”, “conflict resolution”, “community 
development” and “food security”, amongst others)..
The lack of coordination amongst the various 
international organisations remains another serious 
problem.  The Interagency Community Development 
Meeting, for example, was established two years ago 
in Baku in order to arrange and hold meetings with 
governmental and international organisations and 
local NGOs.  At the same time, however, it seems that 
not all major international organisations working 
in the region understand the necessity of such a 
coordinating and consultative body.
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6.2 Recommendations for the EU 
Improve monitoring of ENP AP 
implementation: Since Armenia indicates that it 
can not comply with the requirement of implementing 
the necessary political reforms, it would be advisable 
to consider the possibilities of using concrete 
benchmarking and stricter conditionality in 
monitoring ENP AP implementation. In a first phase, 
the approach which was adopted towards Romania 
and Bulgaria in their pre-accession and accession 
stages, could be applied. This approach consists of 
the prioritisation of reforms of key importance, and 
the use of so-called red, yellow and green cards to 
show positive or negative developments.  
Clear EU approach to the resolution of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict: The EU needs 
to define and follow through a clear approach to 
the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, 
especially as the current dynamics of the conflict 
could very well lead to a renewed confrontation. 
The starting point could be to follow through the 
commitments elaborated in the ENP Action Plan; 
that is, the peaceful resolution of the conflict (the 
preservation of the cease-fire and the political will 
to solve the conflict peacefully) and the promotion 
of people-to-people contacts, as well as the further 
engagement of civil society for demonopolising the 
conflict resolution process. 
Short-term steps: Gradual steps could be taken in 
the short term with regards to:
Increasing the mandate of the EUSR to the level of 
being able to visit Nagorno Karabakh, at a minimum, 
despite the pressure from Azerbaijan, and developing 
a direct communication link between the region and 
the EU. 
Promoting limited CBMs between the parties, in order 
to sustain the cease-fire and to reduce the possibility 
of unintentional escalation (through some exchange 
of information between the sides). This could be done 
in cooperation with the OSCE.
Offering assistance in order to encourage limited 
cooperation across the cease-fire line, including the 
Nagorno Karabakhi authorities, on pest control, 
water management and fire-fighting (past OSCE 
proposals).
Preparing programmes for working with civil 
society and media on conflict resolution issues in 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan, to be managed by 
local European Commission Delegations (and to be 
matched with the proper capacity at the level of the 
which it proposed, demonstrated that there is little 
conflict sensitivity at EU-level. In addition, the EU 
lacks a coherent, principled approach. It can be 
said, therefore, that the limited EU engagement – or 
attempts at EU engagement – has only created more 
distrust, rather than building confidence, especially as 
the parties involved seemed to value the involvement 
of Brussels only from the position of supporting their 
own approach. To date, the effect has been that the 
EU is perceived to be applying double standards 
with regards to both democratic development 
(lack of a strong reaction on the deterioration of 
the political situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan) 
and conflict resolution (also in light of Kosovo’s 
“precedent” debate). Azerbaijan, for example, asked 
the EU not to recognise gains by military force and 
to put pressure on Armenia to liberate the occupied 
territories (as a precondition) whilst Armenia and 
Nagorno Karabakh are requesting EU engagement 
in challenging Azerbaijan’s approach of isolating 
Nagorno Karabakh, by supporting CBMs, economic 
reconstruction, ensuring the protection of human 
rights and by capacity building at society level in the 
conflict areas (an approach used in other conflict areas 
such as Abkhazia). This is another manifestation of 
the inability of international society to overcome the 
pressure from Azerbaijan.   
As was seen in the case of Georgia and Moldova, 
“Europeanisation” in the field of conflict resolution 
can be understood as a process which is activated 
and encouraged by the EU through linking the 
final outcomes of the conflict to a certain degree of 
integration of the parties involved into the European 
structures.  As “Europeanisation” represents a long-
term process, the EU will continue to be perceived and 
judged as an outsider and not as a driver of internal 
transformation processes unless real progress is 
registered in the short term.  
Moreover, Azerbaijan’s approach – the idea that 
international engagement to support reconciliation, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction is possible only 
after a political solution to the conflict has been 
achieved – does not work, as can be seen from the 
dynamics of the conflict in the last 15 years.   
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Delegations). This could be designed as part of a 
strategy at this level to work with civil society within 
clear guidelines and clear organisational structures. 
Exploring the possibilities of engaging with and 
supporting civil society in Nagorno Karabakh through 
a permanent institutional presence of an EU agency 
on its territory, in close consultation with all the 
parties involved. 
Setting of priorities: With regard to the promotion 
of reforms in Armenia, some areas with a clear impact 
on the resolution of the conflict should be addressed 
with priority, such as the Security Sector Reform SSR 
(civilian control over military, fighting corruption in 
the armed forces), the rule of law and the freedom of 
the press.
Support of civil society models: As all three 
conflicting sides seems to lack a proper approach 
to conflict resolution, the efforts of civil society 
organisations to define a model based upon democratic 
mechanisms, reconciliation and reintegration should 
be supported. This reintegration approach should 
include profound internal reforms with regard to the 
economy, social issues, constitutional reform, the 
legal system and the rule of law, infrastructure and 
security issues.
Support debate on “Europeanisation”: The 
EU could also get involved together with other 
international actors in spurring a debate on issues 
related to nationalism and “Europeanisation”, 
both within academic circles and at society level. It 
could show ways in which European countries have 
managed to constructively use nationalist discourse 
without alienating minorities or strengthening 
images of the enemy.  
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